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The Development of the
United Nations (II):
The United Nations During the Cold War (1946-1988)
The
great expectations which availed on the foundation of the world organisation
were quickly disappointed. The East-West Conflict, which manifested by 1947 at
the latest, made constructive work in the UN committees during the first decades
very difficult.
"The
concord between the Allied major powers during the Second World War broke down
as soon as the spoils of war were to be distributed - and with it the hopes for
the 'one world' that the UNO institutionally embodied, and which it was supposed
to protect. Whereas the United Nations succeeded in pegging up a series of
successes in 1947, including the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Iran, the
regulation of the issue concerning Trieste and the retreat of the Anglo-French
troops from the Lebanon and Syria, the former brotherhood in arms between the
world powers and the Soviet Union had turned into a conflict by 1947 at the
latest, which was to characterise international relations and the work of the
United Nations for 40 years.
The
power-political and ideological confrontation between both Blocs ... dominated
the debates and negotiations in all UN committees fro this point onwards, and
most significantly of course, in the
Security Council.
The
function of the organisation to secure peace practically came to a standstill.
What is more, the 'peace-loving major powers', who, according to the statutes,
carried the main responsibility for peace, soon became the catalyst for the most
dangerous breakdown in peace in their fight to achieve influence in the Third
World."
[taken from: Günther Unser/Michaela Wimmer, Die
Vereinten Nationen. Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Bundeszentrale für
politische Bildung, Bonn 1995, P. 37]
However,
the blockade of the Security Council due to the Cold War should not lead us to
the conclusion that the first four decades meant lost time for the UNO, whose
history really first began with the epoch-making revolutionary changes in
1989/90. Such an estimation would fail to take into account the achievements of
the world organisation, such as those in the area of human rights’
preservation or the continued development of international law and
decolonisation. Although it was impossible to apply Chapter VII of the UN
Charter as a core element of the collective security system, the organisation
identified other core areas for work. Despite - or perhaps because of - the
blockade, success was achieved in making important course settings, which
frequently characterise the image of the UNO today as a forum for global
problems.
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"During
the initial phase, the field of activity of the UNO was limited to those
areas in which the direct interests of the major powers were not affected.
The First Secretary-General, Trygve Lie of Norway, was, during the major
part of his term of office (1946-1952), busy expanding the Secretariat and
promoting the United Nations to a position of being able to carry out its
work at the headquarters in New York. Over and above this, ... a series of
specialist and ancillary organisations were called into life to simplify the
rebuilding of devastated areas, particularly in Europe. The climax of this
year was ultimately to be the ’General Declaration of Human Rights’,
drafted by the UN
Commission on Human Rights
- a
specialist organ of the Economic
and Social Council
- and
unanimously accepted by the General
Assembly
on 10th
December 1948." [...more information of the topic of human rights and
all the important documents relating to this can be found under the
Main
Subject
Group of Human Rights on D@dalos]
[taken from: Günther Unser/Michaela Wimmer, Die
Vereinten Nationen. Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Bundeszentrale für
politische Bildung, Bonn 1995, P. 41] |
Following
Stalin's death in 1953, the somewhat more relaxed atmosphere between the Blocs
("peaceful co-existence") and in the United Nations catered for
improved working conditions. Following the year-long stop on admissions, 16 new
member states were able to join the UNO in 1955. The Eastern Bloc countries now
started getting involved in several voluntarily financed UN aid programmes and
specialist organisations which they had boycotted during the first years.
Besides this, Dag Hammarskjöld of the
Sweden was elected to the office of Secretary-General in 1953, and he is still
considered to have been the most outstanding holder until today.
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"Dag
Hammarskjöld considered himself to be a 'mere' representative and
administrative head of the United Nations. With a firm aim in mind and great
aptitude, he used the loopholes in the UN Charter during the following years
to continuously extend the duties and flexibility of the Secretary-General.
Without any particularly request or mandate from the Security Council or the
General Assembly, he attempted to mediate in the sense of 'preventative
diplomacy' as soon as a conflict arose and before the dispute reached a
critical state.
On the
basis of the 'Uniting for Peace Resolution' of 1950 ... the United Nations
developed a completely new instrument - what are referred to as Peacekeeping
Missions – on the instigation of the Secretary-General in the mid-50s,
which were not planned for in the Charter. In contrast to the measures to
'force peace' stipulated in Chapter VII, operations of this nature are not
based on the use of force, but serve to avoid it by installing a 'buffer
zone' between the conflicting parties. |
Since
peace-preserving missions of this nature by the United Nations are only possible
if the conflicting parties involved agree to them, and UN soldiers are not
permitted to use weapons except in self-defence, operations of this kind are
subject to the consent of the majority rather than being pure UN military
actions."
[taken from: Günther Unser/Michaela Wimmer, Die
Vereinten Nationen. Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Bundeszentrale für
politische Bildung, Bonn 1995, P. 45]
The
first occasion on which the "Blue Helmets" went into action was during
the Suez Crisis of 1956, where they functioned as a buffer between the
conflicting parties. Further operations followed in which the range of duties
was continually expanded. An overview of peace missions to-date, whose number
increased significantly after the end of the Cold War [see
the section following in this basic course],
can be
found in the section on History.
Since
the 50s, issues concerning decolonisation have developed into a core area
of work. After the road to independence for the colonies had first been marked
by bloody wars (of liberation), success was achieved - thanks not least to the
United Nations - in steering the process towards orderly and peaceful channels.
"The
process of decolonisation had grave impact on the United Nations itself: The
states who had recently achieved independence all joined the UNO, meaning that
the organisation had 50 new members added between 1955 and 1962. 118 states
already belonged to the United Nations in 1965, and the geographic distribution
changing fundamentally as well. Whereas the UNO consisted of North and South
American and European states alone in 1945, mainly Asiatic and African
countries, and later Oceanic and Caribbean countries, joined as a result of the
wave of decolonisation. As a consequence, the UNO developed from a committee,
which earlier had consisted primarily of the Allies from the Second World War,
into a real world organisation."
[taken from: Günther Unser/Michaela Wimmer, Die
Vereinten Nationen. Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Bundeszentrale für
politische Bildung, Bonn 1995, P. 51-53]
This
changed the face of the United Nations completely. Out of the three task fields
[see Basic Course 1], the original main set of tasks - securing peace - faded
into the background, principally because the Security Council was only capable
of functioning to a limited degree anyway due to the veto power wielded by the
opponents during the Cold War, and the set of tasks dealing with "economic
and social development" took centre-stage.
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Nearly
all the former colonies to join the UNO were developing countries. The
'Third World' countries now had a majority vote in the General Assembly. Development
policy took up a central role in the work of the United Nations from
this point onwards. In 1961, Sithu U Thant of Burma was elected
Secretary-General and the General Assembly announced the "first decade
of development". In 1963, two changes to the UN Charter led to the
number of non-permanent members in the Security Council being increased from
six to ten, and the number of members in the Economic and Social Council
from 18 to 27 (and to 54 in 1971). |
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Geographical
distribution of the 127 UN members (1970) |
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Africa |
42 |
Asia |
29 |
Europe |
27 |
America |
26 |
Oceanic |
3 |
Total |
127 |
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With a
majority in the General Assembly, the developing countries occasioned the
foundation of UNCTAD
(United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development) as a counterweight to the Bretton
Woods organisations,
World Bank and International
Monetary Fund, in
which
the number of votes is measured in terms of investment income, and which failed
to provide the poor states with any potential for shaping it as a result.
In
1966, two institutions - the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance EPTA and
the Special Fund SF founded in 1959 - were placed under the single banner of the
UN Development Programme
UNDP.
Although
the East-West Conflict persevered and continued to make the work of the UNO
difficult, it was now overshadowed by the North-South Conflict.
"The
western states rejected the automatic two-thirds majority of the Third World
states with increasing intensity. The developing countries complained about the
'ignorance of the minority' concerning the problems of the large majority of
humanity. The industrial nations, headed by the USA - as the payer of the
largest subscriptions by far -, lamented the 'tyranny of the majority' of the
Third World in the UN organs ... Since the developing countries contributed less
than three percent of the budget, the Americans were less and less prepared to
accept their recommendations and resolutions on important questions, including
the UN budget."
[taken from: Günther Unser/Michaela Wimmer, Die
Vereinten Nationen. Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Bundeszentrale für
politische Bildung, Bonn 1995, P. 67-69]

[Kurt Waldheim,
UN Secretary-General
1972-1981] |
Helmut Volger
summarises
the development of this phase: "In the United Nations, the Seventies
was the decade of great hope for the countries of the Third World. Many
countries of the Third World felt bolstered in their position, particularly
following the resolution by the General Assembly in October 1971 to replace
the Republic of China (Taiwan) with the Peoples Republic of China, because
the Peoples Republic of China would appear as an agent and representative of
the interests of the Third World as a permanent UN Security Council member.
Efforts
towards a reform of the world economy stood at the centre of the work of the
United Nations during this period (...). As a consequence, a
"Declaration to Establish a New International Economic Order"
was accepted by the UN Special General Assembly on Resources in 1974 in the
consensus procedure. It was supplemented by the "Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States" which the UN General Assembly passed as a
resolution in December 1974.
The
programme for the "New International Economic Order" ... included
fair price relations for the Third World, the step-by-step removal or tariff
and non-tariff barriers to trade, in order to make it easier for the
countries of the Third World to access the industrial nations' markets, and
increased development aid services (...). |
Because
the declaration on the reform of the international economic order needed to be
accepted by all member states - including the industrial nations of the west -
the Third World states were optimistic that rapid implementation of the
individual steps in the reform would succeed. In actual fact during the
following years, they failed, beyond a tiny level of approval, to succeed in
achieving decisive structural changes in the international trade system at the
UNCTAD world trade conferences, during negotiations at the World Bank, at the
International Monetary Fund, or in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), because of the diplomatically clever and stalwart resistance of the
industrial nations to the issue at hand. The UNCTAD conferences in 1983 in
Belgrade finally signalised what ... devastating consequences the failure of the
efforts by the Third World towards a 'new international economic order' would
have for the quality of life of the majority of the peoples of most of the
countries of the Third World."
[taken from: Helmut Volger, Zur Geschichte der
Vereinten Nationen; in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42/1995, Bundeszentrale
für politische Bildung Bonn, P. 7-8]
These
problems of international distribution and the consequent unjustness have still
not been solved today. Due to processes summarised under 'Globalisation', they
have become even worse over the last few decades [further information on this
topic can be found within the framework of the
Main
Subject Group of Globalisation on D@dalos].
The Balance in Securing Peace
The
balance concerning the principal task of the United Nations of securing peace
and international security proved ambivalent during the first few decades.
Whereas during the Berlin, Suez and Cuba crises, it can be said that world
organisation succeeded, the UNO was clearly overtaxed during the Congo mission,
and this anticipated the future problems of the peace missions [an historical
summary of all peace missions can be found in the section on
History].
The Berlin Crisis: The United Nations as a Negotiation Forum
"In the
case of the Berlin Blockade, which appeared daily on the General Assembly’s
agenda at the end of September 1948 at the request of the western powers, the
USSR may have prevented the Council's resolution being passed, but diplomatic
activities did occur at the United Nations during the period following. In
October 1948, Secretary-General Lie mediated discussion contacts with the Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister Wyschinskij through his employees Sobolew (USSR) and
Feller (USA) at the request of the American UN delegate Jessup. The attempt at
negotiations remained unsuccessful however.
Following
US President Truman's decision on 31. January 1949 to reply to an indirect
proposal for negotiation made by Stalin in an interview with a US press agency
by giving a signal demonstrating his readiness to talk, the USA consciously
chose the United Nations for the secret discussions. The American UN delegate
Jessup repeatedly met with the Soviet UN delegate Malik and negotiated the end
of the blockade with him. Despite the Security Council being blocked by the
veto, the United Nations proved its worth in the Berlin Conflict as an
instrument for settling conflicts."
[taken from: Helmut Volger, Zur Geschichte der
Vereinten Nationen; in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42/1995, Bundeszentrale
für politische Bildung Bonn, P. 4]
Collective
Security System: The Basic Concept and Problem
The
Berlin Crisis demonstrates that important functions of the United nations appear
well below the threshold of "spectacular" peace missions. It also
provides a forum for discussions, particularly in times of crisis, where absent
channels of communication may lead to an escalation in conflict. This certainly
fails to live up to the demands of a functioning, collective security system,
the simple fundamental idea of which consists of a potential aggressor being
confronted by a closed front made up of all members, which is why he would avoid
an attack from the very beginning (in the ideal case). If he attacks
nevertheless, the state which is attacked would be defended by all the states in
the system.
A
system of this type has not worked (up until now), and critics state that it is
not capable of working for structural reasons, which the history of the United
Nations to-date confirms. This is because it would not be required (if the
important members are in accord), or it would not function (if they are not).
Despite
this, action which was expressly authorised by the Security Council took place
under the leadership of the USA in 1950 following the attack on South Korea by
North Korea. However, this represents a special case, since it was only possible
to pass the resolution in the Security Council, because the Soviet Union had
stayed away from sessions at the time (in protest against the Peoples Republic
of China not being accepted into the United Nations in place of Taiwan).
The
Suez Crisis: The Peace Troops Come into Being
"The
Suez Conflict of 1956 represents an important test period for the United
Nations' peacekeeping system: on the one hand, the United Nations failed to
conduct business successfully, despite the direct participation of two permanent
Security Council members - Great Britain and France -, because the USA had
placed strong political pressure on both to agree to a mediation solution, and
because - following Great Britain and France blocking the Security Council with
their veto right - the Council had resolved to call an emergency meeting of the
General Assembly with the votes of the USA and USSR according to the Uniting for
Peace Resolution procedure.
On the
suggestion of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, the General Assembly resolved to
send in UN troops to monitor the maintenance of the previously agreed
cease-fire: this involved the first UN peace troops and signalised a further
development of the Charter in which UN troops of this type were not planned for,
and who were not meant to impose sanctions according to Chapter VII following a
breakdown in peace, but were merely meant to secure a cease-fire with the
agreement of the conflicting parties. Today, they are most certainly the most
important instrument that the United Nations has."
[taken from: Helmut Volger, Zur Geschichte der
Vereinten Nationen; in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42/1995, Bundeszentrale
für politische Bildung Bonn, P. 6]
The
Congo Conflict: The Peace Troops are Overtaxed
The
peace mission to the Congo between 1960 and 1964 demonstrated the limits
of the new instrument and dampened the optimism linked to the peace
troops. Sven Gareis and Johannes Varwick sum up the failure of the mission:
"The
temporary success of the UNEF Mission had resulted in highly optimistic
expectations for securing peace by the United Nations at the beginning of
the 1960s. This stance found expression amongst other things in the
ambitious operation in the Congo ... (ONUC), which partially ignored the
principles set up by Hammarskjöld. Beginning with Resolution 143 of July
1960, the Security Council's mandate was extended by a total of four
further resolutions. |
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Hammarskjöld's
Fundamental Principles for Blue Helmet Operations:
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All
conflicting parties must agree to the mission. |
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The
United Nations is responsible for the operation, i.e. observation
missions and peace troops function as ancillary organs of the
Security Council. |
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The
Blue Helmets are unbiased. |
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The
Blue Helmets are only allowed to use weapons in self-defence. |
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The
ONUC mission, which involved nearly 20,000 servicemen at its peak, was
originally instigated to support the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo
Republic, but was enlarged to ensure its territorial integrity, prevent the
outbreak of a civil war, or at least limit it, and support the government in
setting up offices.
With
Security Council resolution 161 of February 1961, the peace troops were
permitted to use weapons beyond self-defence for the first time in order to
carry out their orders. As a result, they increasingly became a party to the
conflict in contrast to the original concept. Following initial successes, ONUC
became the first 'major peacekeeping failure' (Jett). The United Nations became
increasingly entangled in the unsolved interior problems of the Congo Republic
(...).
The
lessons learnt from the Congo mission, which William Durch referred to
exaggeratedly as 'The UNO's Vietnam', were lasting. No mission of comparable
complexity or size was to take place for another three decades. The
peace-keeping aims of the UNO became more moderate after this point. The United
Nations reflected upon the principles formulated by Hammarskjöld, and sought
the agreement of the conflicting parties before starting a mission."
[taken from: Sven
Gareis/Johannes Varwick, Die Vereinten Nationen. Aufgaben, Instrumente und Reformen;
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung Schriftenreihe Band 403, Bonn 2003, P.
122-123]
The
Cuba Crisis: Successful Mediation
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"In the
Cuba Crisis of 1962, which brought about the acute danger of a nuclear war
between the USA and the USSR, the United Nations achieved one of its most
monumental achievements. At the high point of the confrontation, just as
Soviet ships were on their way to Cuba, whose waters US President Kennedy
had declared as a quarantine zone for Soviet ships, UN Secretary-General U Thant succeeded in halting escalations by sending similarly penned letters
to
Khrushchev and Kennedy on 24th October, in which he requested a period
of standstill, and where he urged both sides to avoid further confrontations
in two further letters of 25th October (...). |
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Quotation
from the letter written by U Thant to
Khrushchev and Kennedy:
"I
believe that a voluntary postponement for a period of two or three
weeks would take considerable pressure off the situation and give the
parties involved a chance to meet and discuss with the aim of finding
a peaceful solution to the problem. In this relation, I would be glad
to place myself at the disposal of all parties for any services that I
may be in the position to provide."
[quoted from: Helmut
Volger, Zur Geschichte der
Vereinten Nationen; in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42/1995, Bundeszentrale
für politische Bildung Bonn, P. 6, Anm. 17] |
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The
United Nations played a decisive role in managing the Cuba Crisis: U Thant's
initiative contributed to avoiding a direct confrontation, gave both sides the
chance to search for alternative solutions, and allowed them to withdraw from
positions clung to until that time without losing face, so as to arrive at a
peaceful solution to the problem."
[taken from: Helmut Volger, Zur Geschichte der
Vereinten Nationen; in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42/1995, Bundeszentrale
für politische Bildung Bonn, P. 6-7]
Gareis/Varwick
Account for the Ambivalence
"If one
balances up the experience of the first four decades of UN peace-keeping in
summary, a mixed image results. First, it needs to be stated that each mission
is a special case, and does not take place according to a fixed course and the
same plan in every detail. The idealistic notions from the UN Charter (and, in
particular, the wide-ranging rulings in Chapter VII) hardly proved to be
applicable in practice, which is why an innovative instrument was created in the
'Blue Helmets', who had not been planned for in the Charter.
The
missions aimed mainly at aiding the parties involved in a conflict to find a
solution, or 'bringing the violent part of the conflict to a end' (Kühne) ...
Missions by the Blue Helmets functioned as a method of quietening down the
dispute, but did provide a solution to conflicts, not out of moderation or
failing trust in the ability of the United Nations to find a solution, but out
of conceptual reserve, strategic prudence and limitation to the doable. The aim
of quietening down the conflict was achieved in the majority of cases.
Frequently however, - as in the case of Cyprus – this only took place at the
cost of a massive permanent presence. If - as in the case of the Congo - this
restraint were to be given up, the results would probably be negative."
[taken from: Sven Gareis/Johannes
Varwick, Die Vereinten Nationen. Aufgaben, Instrumente und Reformen;
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung Schriftenreihe Band 403, Bonn 2003, P.
124]
The
United Nations Crisis
The
already limited potential for securing peace continued to thin out during the
course of the 70s and 80s. A United Nations crisis was spoken of in general, and
this took on existential proportions for the world organisation in the mid-80s
as the following text excerpt demonstrates:
"In
terms of securing peace, the United Nations found itself in a deep crisis in the
Seventies and Eighties: although it continued to maintain a presence in the Near
East and Cyprus through a series of peace-keeping missions, it failed to prevent
repeated military confrontations taking place in both conflict zones. It was
equally wanting in making a contribution to the settlement of newly burgeoning
warring conflicts in Nicaragua, West Sahara, Cambodia and Afghanistan, and the
growing war between Iran and Iraq.

[Pérez de Cuéllar,
UN Secretary-General
1982-1991] |
During
this phase of international politics, the main problem lay in the fact that
the suggestions for solutions made by the United Nations were paid little
attention to. In his annual report to the General Assembly of 1983, Pérez
de Cuéllar spoke of a "process of disintegration in multilateralism
and internationalism' which is seriously detrimental to the work of the
United Nations. He lamented the tendency of the major powers to get involved
in regional disputes using weapons: 'This went so far in several cases, that
regional conflicts degenerated into replacement wars for the more powerful
nations. In situations like this, there is a tendency to circumnavigate or
snuff out the United Nations or ... to use it as exclusively a platform for
exchanging polemic blows.' (...)
The
crises in securing peace developed into a general existential crisis for the
United Nations due to the policy of withdrawal of the USA and its refusal to
pay subscriptions under the Presidency of Reagan during the Eighties. This
policy was triggered by the USA's anger at its defeat during voting in the
General Assembly and the resolutions of the Security Council, where it saw
itself forced to make use of its veto in order to prevent sanctionary
measures against South Africa and South Rhodesia, and criticism of the
policies of Israel against its neighbouring states and the Palestinians. |
In
addition to this, accusations surfaced within the USA concerning the
administrative apparatus of the United Nations: it was accused of working
inefficiently and wasting cash resources (...) [see Basic
Course 5
for
more information on the problems concerning the United Nations]. Far graver were
the consequences of the USA refusing to pay its subscriptions to the full extent
in 1986."
[taken from: Helmut Volger, Zur Geschichte der
Vereinten Nationen; in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42/1995, Bundeszentrale
für politische Bildung Bonn, P. 8]
The
United Nations' financial crisis could have been prevented by a compromise, but
instead, the world organisation began leading a nebulous existence in
international politics. This suddenly changed with the end of the East-West
Conflict...
[Author: Ragnar Müller]
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