Model 1

At the top of this hierarchy are politicians, making political decisions and giving impetus to the "real world". They set the budget, legislate and organize subsidies, while at the same time governing within (tight) limits. In doing this, they prompt a reaction among the public which is returned as feedback. This, in turn, is used to form a political agenda which is passed down to the media, which is completely dependent on this flow of information. The media then communicates this agenda down to the general public.

This model would appear to be very simple indeed and conforms well with the idea of the media as the servant of politics, as described in the fable on the previous page. Nevertheless, a number of empirical observations about the character of the communications process, and a series of arguments to be found in political literature support this model.

The most important reason for supposing a pre-eminent role for parties and politics in the communications process is the fact that they are the ones with the active part. They hold party conferences; give interviews; make decisions in parliament and in government. All parties are interested in finding highly-relevant and explosive issues in order to grab the public's attention and gain comprehensive acceptance. To achieve this, they employ their own teams, commission political research companies and keep a close eye on public opinion.

Ruling parties, however, are not on an equal footing with parties in opposition. This is because the ruling party has greater material resources at its disposal (...). The ruling party also has greater personnel resources, because government personnel and party personnel can be added together. Another great advantage comes from the fact that the ruling party is more active and better placed to set the agenda. According to Wolfgang Bersdorf, "the party that dominates the issues up for political discussion is one step in front of its opponents; the chance of the dominant party's opinion on a given issue becoming accepted public opinion is greater (...).

Because of their ability to offer only vocal alternatives and their inability to back them up with facts, parties in opposition have a clear strategic disadvantage in setting the political agenda. To counter this deficit, opposition parties look to polarize their political positions (more solidarity, equality and freedom or perhaps more emphasis on the free market and freedom). This kind of polarization, however, tends only to benefit the smaller parties which have a clear ideological base and impetus (...). "Large parties (...) are faced with a problem. On the one hand, they have to portray themselves as being a government in waiting and demonstrate an ability to govern responsibly, while on the other hand, they also have to offer opposition to the government. All this leaves them in an awkward position.

All the same, opposition parties can make up for this structural "communications-management" disadvantage. Indeed, this has to be true, for there have been many changes of government in the past. Were this not the case surely the ruling party (the head of government) would simply establish itself as the great communicator and use its freedom to determine public opinion - by choosing the issues, presenting the official version, steering events and by drawing on informal contacts to journalists. The ruling party's advantage is frustrated by two factors, firstly, clear mistakes by the government and, secondly, the independence of the press - which we will be discussing in more detail in the next model (...).

A new and central issue is "symbolic politics", that is, the staging of (supposed) political reality by parties and politicians. According to critics, there is a growing tendency towards marketing politics as a public relations exercise. Increasingly, the way in which policies are presented and marketed rather than their substance is becoming decisive in getting a majority. Political parties, it is said, are guilty of presenting artificial communication products to the public. Critics say that there is no longer any interest in making political decisions transparent and that the focus is now on the surface structure and the demonstrative appearance of politics. The more complicated the policy, the more likely political players are to turn to rituals and symbolic consolidation. Political symbolism, so the theory goes, leads to strategies based on personalization, campaigns based on feeling and a purely illusionary focus on ideology. "The basic premise is that the communicative veil of symbolic politics often serves in concealing more than it reveals."

This symbolism and associated professional PR work implemented by parties reaches its peak during an election campaign (...). If symbolism and PR work is part and parcel of everyday life, it becomes all-encompassing at election time: "Media broadcasted personalization, staged presentations, symbolic actions and the exchange of statements drawing on political rhetoric characterize political marketing." (...) Research into political communication methods used during election campaigns has produced contradictory results: Some regard PR professionals employed by the parties as holding all the power, while others warn that the media and political journalists have become too strong.

(...) This is also one of the basic problems associated with the so plausible and popular differentiation between "just" symbolic politics and actual "real" politics. Given that the media is the main source of almost all information for the majority of the electorate, where does this leave "real" politics? Isn't it true that the lines between the two are being blurred? Are we in real danger of living in a world where politics takes place according to the Potemkim principle: "Only that which is seen is real, only that which is real is effective." Is political symbolism bad, because it is manipulative, and real politics good, because it is tactile? Isn't it true that party's ideas and visions are also being put in the dock, despite the fact that many regard them as good symbols? And aren't extreme poverty and severe corruption characteristic of an exceptionally bad political reality? Not only does this lead us to an argument about a constructive media theory, but also to more fundamental epistemological problems. There are also a great number of further questions that shake the foundations of the top-down model, which supposes centralized control of the media and public opinion by politics. Let's take a look at the next model.

[Taken and translated from: Ulrich von Alemann, Parteien und Medien, in: O. Gabriel u.a. (Hg.), Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland, Bonn BpB 1997]